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WALKING A TIGHTROPE: REDRAWING
CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT LINES AFTER
SHAW V. RENO AND ITS PROGENY
Donovan L. Wickline*
Introduction
For over thirty years, the Voting Rights Act ("VRA")1 has qui-
etly revolutionized2 minority voting rights and power in the United
States. Congress enacted the VRA in 1965 as a response to the
array of discriminatory devices that southern jurisdictions used to
deny Blacks political participation after the passage of the Fif-
teenth Amendment.3 Today, some commentators consider the
VRA to be the most effective civil rights statute ever.4 The most
dramatic example of the immediate effectiveness of the VRA oc-
cured in Mississippi, where the Black registration rate soared from
6.7% to 59.4% within three years of the statute's passage.5 More-
over, the number of Black elected officials increased in the seven
originally targeted southern states from fewer than 100 in 1965 to
3265 in 1989.6
The quiet era of the VRA, however, has ended. In recent years,
the statute has gained center stage in the debate over the constitu-
* J.D. Candidate, Fordham University School of Law, 1998; A.B., Columbia
University, 1995. The author wishes to thank Professor Terry Smith, Fordham Uni-
versity School of Law, for his insightful comments and guidance.
1. Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973 to 1973bb-1 (1998).
2. See generally QUIET REVOLUTION IN THE SOUTH: THE IMPACt OF THE VOT-
ING RIGHTS AcT, 1965-1990 (Chandler Davidson & Bernard Grofman eds., 1994)
(showing how the VRA "quietly" enfranchised Black voters in the South during its
first twenty-five years) [hereinafter QUIET REVOLUTION].
3. The Fifteenth Amendment states in pertinent part: "The right of citizens of the
United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any
State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude." U.S. CONST.
amend. XV, § 1.
4. See Chandler Davidson & Bernard Grofman, The Voting Rights Act and the
Second Reconstruction, in QUIET REVOLUTION, supra note 2, at 386.
5. See James E. Alt, The Impact of the Voting Rights Act on Black and White
Voter Registration in the South, in QUIET REVOLUTION, supra note 2, at 374 tbl.12.1.
6. See Chandler Davidson, The Voting Rights Act: A Brief History, in CONTRO-
VERSIES IN MINORITY VOTING: THE VOTING RIGHTS Acr IN PERSPECTIVE 7, 43 (Ber-
nard Grofman & Chandler Davidson eds., 1992) [hereinafter CONTROVERSIES]. The
seven originally targeted states were Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, South
Carolina, Virginia, and 40 counties in North Carolina. Id. at 19.
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tionality of a variety of race-conscious public policies.7 In voting
rights cases, the dispute has focused on a remedy to certain viola-
tions of the VRA: the creation of majority-minority election dis-
tricts8 where voting is otherwise polarized along racial lines.
In Shaw v. Reno ("Shaw I")9 and its progeny, 10 the United States
Supreme Court invalidated majority-minority congressional dis-
tricts in North Carolina, Georgia, and Texas using strict scrutiny
analysis under the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection
Clause ("EPC").11 By requiring that majority-minority congres-
sional districts be redrawn, however, the Supreme Court has in-
7. Although the continued necessity for affirmative action programs has domi-
nated this debate, the constitutional arguments and analyses, regarding the legality of
affirmative action and the constitutionality of majority-minority voting districts, are
substantially parallel. Compare Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200
(1995) (ruling that strict scrutiny must be applied to federal affirmative action pro-
grams) and City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (striking down
a city minority set-aside program after applying strict scrutiny) with Miller v. Johnson,
515 U.S. 900 (1995) (striking down a majority-minority voting district after applying
strict scrutiny) and Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993) (ruling that strict scrutiny must
be applied to a majority-minority voting district that was so bizarre in shape that only
unconstitutional racial gerrymandering could provide the explanation).
8. Majority-minority election districts are geographic areas where voting-age mi-
norities constitute an electoral majority. See United States v. Hays, 515 U.S. 737, 739
(1995).
9. 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
10. Abrams v. Johnson, 117 S. Ct. 1925 (1997); Shaw v. Hunt ("Shaw H"), 116 S.
Ct. 1894 (1996); Bush v. Vera, 116 S. Ct. 1941 (1996); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900
(1995).
11. The Fourteenth Amendment states in pertinent part: "No State shall ... deny
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 1.
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vited litigation under Sections 212 and 513 of the VRA.14 As a
result of the Court's decisions, state legislatures face a Catch-22. If
they use race as a predominant factor in drawing congressional dis-
tricts, they are subject to strict scrutiny under the EPC. If they fail
to draw majority-minority districts, however, they are subject to lit-
igation under Sections 2 and 5 of the VRA.
This Note explores the tension between the Supreme Court's
recognition of a new cause of action under the EPC and the estab-
lished requirements of the VRA. Part I explains how the EPC
originally was interpreted to protect voting rights and how Con-
gress, in an effort to provide further protection, enacted the VRA.
12. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1998). Section 2 provides:
(a) No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice,
or procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivi-
sion in a manner which results in a denial or abridgment of the right of any
citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color ....
(b) A violation of subsection (a) of this section is established if, based on
the totality of the circumstances, it is shown that the political processes lead-
ing to nomination or election in the State or political subdivision are not
equally open to participation by members of a class of citizens protected by
subsection (a) of this section in that its members have less opportunity than
other members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to
elect representatives of their choice. The extent to which members of a pro-
tected class have been elected to office in the State or political subdivision is
one circumstance which may be considered: Provided, That nothing in this
section establishes a right to have members of a protected class elected in
numbers equal to their proportion in the population.
Id.
13. Id. at § 1973c. Section 5 is intended to identify and eliminate any new state
voting requirements or procedures, in those jurisdictions found to have histories of
systemic racial discrimination, that have the purpose or effect of "denying or abridg-
ing the right to vote on account of race or color." Id.; see also Beer v. United States,
425 U.S. 130, 141 (1976) ("[T]he purpose of Section 5 has always been to insure that
no voting-procedure changes would be made that would lead to a retrogression in the
position of racial minorities with respect to their effective exercise of the electoral
franchise."). The Justice Department's long-standing interpretation of section 5 in-
corporates the "results" standard of section 2. See Heather K. Way, Note, A Shield or
a Sword? Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act and the Argument for the Incorporation of
Section 2, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1439, 1439 (1996). But see Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd.,
117 S. Ct. 1491, 1501 (1997) (holding that preclearance under section 5 may not be
denied solely because a covered jurisdiction's new voting "standard, practice, or pro-
cedure" violates section 2).
14. See Johnson v. Miller ("Johnson III"), 922 F. Supp. 1556 (S.D. Ga. 1995), affd
sub nom. Abrams v. Johnson, 117 S. Ct. 1925 (1997). As a result of the Supreme
Court's decision in Miller, the Southern District of Georgia ordered a remedial con-
gressional districting plan that reduced the number of majority-Black districts from
three to one. See Johnson III, 922 F. Supp. at 1561. Thereafter, the minority groups
in Abrams challenged this court-ordered plan as retrogressive and a dilution of Black
voting strength in violation of sections 2 and 5 of the VRA. See Brief for Appellants
at *i, Abrams (No. 95-1425), available in 1996 WL 416713; see also infra Part II.C.2.
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Part II reviews the Supreme Court decisions in Shaw I and its prog-
eny and examines the tension created by application of the VRA
and EPC. Part III argues that the VRA and EPC can coexist in
harmony if the Court holds that compliance with the statute is a
compelling state interest, and that a majority-minority district
drawn to remedy a Section 2 violation is narrowly tailored by vir-
tue of what the plaintiffs must show to establish the violation in the
first instance. The Note concludes that the Court should clarify the
meaning and role of "compactness '15 in redistricting and provide
some guideposts for the legislators, litigants, and courts involved in
the reapportionment process.
I. Background
A. The EPC Protects Voting Rights
In the United States, voting is a fundamental political right.16
Over 100 years ago, the Fifteenth Amendment 7 was ratified, con-
stitutionally guaranteeing the right to vote for minorities.' 8 The
need for the protections of the Fourteenth Amendment 9 in the
voting rights context became clear, however, because states at-
tempted to deny Blacks their right of suffrage through discrimina-
tory devices such as poll taxes, literacy tests, and racial
15. "Compactness" in redistricting may refer to the shape of the district or the
dispersion of the population within the district, but the Supreme Court has never
provided clear guidance for determining what "compact" means or how the analysis
regarding whether a district's shape is compact should interrelate with the inquiry that
focuses on population. See infra Parts II.C.1 and III.B.2.
16. See Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966)
("[W]ealth or fee paying has, in our view, no relation to voting qualifications; the right
to vote is too precious, too fundamental to be so burdened or conditioned."); Reyn-
olds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561-62 (1964) ("Undoubtedly, the right of suffrage is a
fundamental matter in a free and democratic society."); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S.
356, 370 (1886) (referring to "the political franchise of voting" as a "fundamental
political right, because preservative of all rights"); see also LAURENCE H. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16-10, at 1460-61 (2d ed. 1988) (stating that the
right at stake in cases involving voting rights is one to equal participation in govern-
mental and societal decision-making).
17. U.S. CONST. amend. XV.
18. The Fifteenth Amendment states in pertinent part: "The right of citizens of the
United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any
State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude." Id. § 1.
19. The Fourteenth Amendment states in pertinent part: "No State shall ... deny
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 1.
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gerrymandering of voting districts.20 Some states even created at-
large election schemes. These plans diluted the potential voting
strength of minorities because the larger White population would
vote cohesively for its preferred candidates. 21 Other states gerry-
mandered districts22 so that minorities were either excluded from
important voting districts23 or scattered among various districts, en-
suring that they could never constitute a majority of votes in any
district. 24 Therefore, both the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amend-
ments are necessary to constitutionally guarantee the right to vote
and to protect the right of a citizen to have his or her vote count.
The EPC of the Fourteenth Amendment 25 requires that a citizen
not only be allowed to vote, but also possess voting power that is
weighted equally to that of other citizens.26 In equal protection
20. See, e.g., South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 310-13 (1966) (discussing
the history of discriminatory voting procedures designed specifically to prevent Black
citizens from exercising their right to vote).
21. See, e.g., Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 616 (1982) (striking down the use of
an at-large electoral system and upholding the lower court's order that the state adopt
single-member districts). At-large or multimember district electoral plans dilute mi-
nority voting strength when the majority group votes cohesively for the candidates of
their choice, effectively barring the minority group from electing any of the candidates
of their choice. Id. at 616-17. At-large election schemes disfranchised Blacks by indi-
rection because White officials would abolish districts entirely and place Black voters
in majority-White multimember districts. See Davidson, supra note 6, at 24.
In City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980), the Supreme Court made it sub-
stantially more difficult for minority plaintiffs to challenge at-large or multimember
districts when it held that they had to prove intent to discriminate on the basis of race
if they were to successfully bring a claim of vote dilution under section 2 of the VRA.
Id. at 66. In 1982, however, Congress amended section 2 effectively overruling the
Court's holding in Bolden by prohibiting any voting practice, regardless of its! pur-
pose, that results in discrimination. See supra note 12.
22. The term gerrymander, named after Massachusetts Governor Elbridge Gerry,
became popular in 1812 after then-governor Gerry approved a salamander-shaped
district drawn by the state legislature to benefit his Democratic party. See Kristin
Silverberg, Note, The Illegitimacy of the Incumbent Gerrymander, 74 TEX. L. REV.
913, 922-23 (1996).
23. See, e.g., Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52, 53-56 (1964) (upholding a New
York congressional apportionment statute excluding African American and Puerto
Rican citizens from one district and placing them in other districts because the plain-
tiffs failed to prove discriminatory intent); Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 340
(1960) (ruling that an Alabama law was unconstitutional if petitioners could show that
the all-White Alabama legislature redrew Tuskegee's municipal boundaries to exclude
all but four or five of the city's 500 Black voters, but none of its White ones).
24. See Davidson, supra note 6, at 24, which discusses how redistricting processes
dominated by Whites resulted in gerrymandering to disfranchise Blacks by indirection
so that they would not make up a majority of the voters in any district.
25. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
26. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 560-61 (1964) ("[T]he fundamental princi-
ple of representative government in this country is one of equal representation for
equal numbers of people ....").
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cases, the Supreme Court applies strict scrutiny to legislative ac-
tions when a plaintiff proves that the government possessed a ra-
cially discriminatory intent or purpose.27 When a plaintiff shows
such intent, the Court requires the defendant to show that the leg-
islature narrowly tailored its law to satisfy a compelling govern-
mental interest.28
To prove discriminatory intent, a plaintiff must show either that
a law clearly, or on its face, discriminates on the basis of race,29 or
that in its application a clear pattern emerges that is "unexplain-
able on grounds other than race." 3° If the plaintiff proves that dis-
criminatory purpose is one motivating factor in the decision to
enact the legislation, then strict scrutiny must be applied.3'
27. Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 912 (1995) ("[S]tatutes are subject to strict
scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause not just when they contain express racial
classifications, but also when, though race neutral on their face, they are motivated by
a racial purpose or object.").
28. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) ("[Racial]
classifications are constitutional only if they are narrowly tailored measures that fur-
ther compelling governmental interests."). Moreover, in City of Richmond v. Croson,
the Court stated:
Indeed, the purpose of strict scrutiny is to "smoke out" illegitimate uses of
race by assuring that the legislative body is pursuing a goal important
enough to warrant use of a highly suspect tool. The test also assures that the
means chosen "fit" this compelling goal so closely that there is little or no
possibility that the motive for the classification was illegitimate racial preju-
dice or stereotype.
488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989). This strict scrutiny test is difficult to overcome. See Bush v.
Vera, 116 S. Ct. 1941, 1978 (1996) (Stevens, J., joined by Ginsburg and Breyer, J.J.,
dissenting ) ("[W]e apply 'strict scrutiny' more to describe the likelihood of success
than the character of the test to be applied."). But see Korematsu v. United States,
323 U.S. 214, 219-20 (1944) (upholding the use of internment camps, during World
War II, for persons of Japanese ancestry after applying strict scrutiny).
29. See, e.g., Croson, 488 U.S. at 477-78 (striking down a city program that set-
aside contracts for minority businesses).
30. Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252,
266 (1977). The Arlington Heights Court stated that "[a]bsent a pattern as stark as
that in Gomillion or Yick Wo, impact alone is not determinative," and the Court must
look to direct and circumstantial evidence of discriminatory purpose. Id. In Yick Wo
v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886), the Court held a facially race-neutral city ordinance
to be unconstitutional under the EPC because the plaintiffs showed that it was admin-
istered exclusively against Chinese immigrants. Id. at 374. In Gomillion v. Lightfoot,
364 U.S. 339 (1960), the Court held that if the petitioners proved their allegations that
an Alabama law created a racially gerrymandered district, the statute infringed on the
right of Blacks to vote in violation of the Fifteenth Amendment. Id. at 341-42.
31. See Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 265-66. In Arlington Heights, the plaintiff, a
nonprofit real estate developer, alleged that the city violated minorities' equal protec-
tion rights by refusing to rezone a fifteen-acre parcel so as to permit the construction
of low- and moderate-income housing. Id. at 252. The Court held that the plaintiff
failed to prove that racially discriminatory intent or purpose was a motivating factor
in the zoning decision, thus ending the constitutional inquiry. Id. at 270.
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The Supreme Court has used the EPC to create principles gov-
erning the mapping of voting districts. Applying strict scrutiny
analysis, the Court has struck down redistricting plans that used at-
large electoral schemes because they classified citizens on the basis
of race.3z Moreover, it held that a state legislature that was not
apportioned on a population basis violated the EPC because it un-
constitutionally diluted voter strength.33 Almost as soon as states
were forbidden from using various discriminatory voting devices,
however, they created new practices to prevent Black citizens from
voting.34 Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to remedy
the problem,35 but state and local governments continued to deny
minority citizens their right to vote.36
B. The Voting Rights Act
Congress enacted the Voting Rights Act in 1965 to enforce the
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to the Constitution.37 The
VRA contained broad provisions38 that sought not only to provide
Blacks access to the voting booth, but also to force states to end all
discriminatory voting practices, 39 including literacy tests and poll
32. See Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 616-17 (1982); see also supra note 21 and
accompanying text.
33. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 576-77 (1964) (establishing the one-person,
one-vote principle by holding that every voting district in a state must be constructed
as nearly of equal population as practicable); see also infra text accompanying notes
47-49.
34. See, e.g., South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 310-13 (1966) (listing
various practices designed to deprive Black citizens of the vote); Gomillion v.
Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 341-42 (1960) (forbidding racial gerrymandering of districts);
Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944) (declaring White primaries unconstitutional);
Guinn and Beal v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915) (invalidating grandfather
clauses); see also supra note 20 and accompanying text.
35. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1971
(1998)).
36. See Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 314 ("Even when favorable decisions have finally
been obtained, some of the States affected have merely switched to discriminatory
devices not covered by the federal decrees or have enacted difficult new tests
designed to prolong the existing disparity between white and Negro registration.").
37. H.R. REP. No. 89-439, at 6 (1965), reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2437.
38. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 315-16 (outlining the stringent remedies the VRA
aimed at voting discrimination). "After enduring nearly a century of widespread
resistance to the Fifteenth Amendment, Congress has marshalled an array of potent
weapons against the evil, with authority in the Attorney General to employ them
effectively." Id. at 337.
39. According to Sen. Jacob Javits, the VRA's purpose was "not only to correct an
active history of discrimination, the denying to Negroes of the right to register and
vote, but also to deal with the accumulation of discrimination.... The bill would
attempt to do something about accumulated wrongs and the continuance of the
wrongs." S. REP. No. 97-417, at 5 (1982) (quoting 111 CONG. REC. 8295 (1965)).
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taxes.4" In addition, the VRA required that jurisdictions with a his-
tory of discrimination which depressed political participation re-
ceive federal preclearance before adopting any new voting
requirement or procedure.41
Although Congress ensured that Black citizens had the right to
register and cast a ballot, many jurisdictions adopted discrimina-
tory measures designed to circumvent the empowerment of minor-
ity voters.42 As a result, the courts and executive branch had to
address the issue of vote dilution to ensure that Black citizens were
provided effective political power.43 Challenges to such state vot-
ing procedures occur under Sections 2 and 5 of the VRA, as well as
under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.44
Section 2 authorizes claims by private citizens against a state for
unlawful vote dilution.45 In Reynolds v. Sims, 46 decided the year
before the VRA was passed, the Supreme Court held for the first
time that "the* right of suffrage can be denied by a debasement or
dilution of the weight of a citizen's vote just as effectively as by
wholly prohibiting the free exercise of the franchise. ' 47 Five years
later, in Allen v. State Board of Elections,48 the Court relied on the
Reynolds one-person, one-vote decision to conclude that diluting
the voting strength of racial minorities violated the VRA.49
40. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1965). Section 2 originally provided that "[n]o voting quali-
fication or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure shall be imposed
or applied by any State or political subdivision to deny or abridge the right of any
citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color." Id.
41. Id. at § 1973c; see supra note 13.
42. See Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (1969) (creating at-large vot-
ing system for county officeholders); see also supra notes 20-21 and accompanying
text.
43. See Pamela S. Karlan, Maps and Misreadings: The Role of Geographic Com-
pactness in Racial Vote Dilution Litigation, 24 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 173, 184
(1989).
44. See Bernard Grofman, Would Vince Lombardi Have Been Right if He Had
Said: "When it Comes to Redistricting, Race isn't Everything it's the Only Thing?", 14
CARDOZO L. REV. 1237, 1239 (1993).
45. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1998). See supra note 21 for examples of vote dilution.
46. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
47. Id. at 555; see supra note 33 and accompanying text.
48. 393 U.S. 544 (1969).
49. See id. at 565-66, 569. The Allen Court stated that:
The right to vote can be affected by a dilution of voting power as well as
by an absolute prohibition on casting a ballot .... Voters who are members
of a racial minority might well be in the majority in one district, but in a
decided minority in the county as a whole. This type of change could there-
fore nullify their ability to elect the candidate of their choice just as would




In 1980, however, the Supreme Court abruptly changed the land-
scape of vote dilution litigation with its decision in City of Mobile v.
Bolden.50 In Bolden, the Court held that plaintiffs in vote dilution
cases must prove that the challenged system was enacted or main-
tained in order to deprive Blacks of political power. 51 By requiring
plaintiffs to prove intent, litigation challenging discriminatory vot-
ing practices under the Constitution and Section 2 of the VRA
dried up.52
In response to Bolden, Congress added an important amend-
ment to Section 2 in 1982, eliminating the requirement of discrimi-
natory intent and providing that any voting procedure that lessens
the opportunity of minority voters to elect the candidates of their
choice violates Section 2 of the VRA.53 In Thornburg v. Gingles,54
however, the Supreme Court established three preconditions5
plaintiffs challenging an apportionment plan under Section 2 must
prove: (1) that the minority group "is sufficiently large and geo-
graphically compact to constitute a majority in a single-member
district; '56 (2) that it is "politically cohesive;" 57 and (3) that "the
white majority votes sufficiently as a bloc to enable it... usually to
defeat the minority's preferred candidate."58 If plaintiffs show that
50. 446 U.S. 55 (1980); see supra note 21 and accompanying text.
51. See id. at 66.
52. Laughlin McDonald, The 1982 Amendments of Section 2 and Minority Repre-
sentation, in CONTROVERSIES, supra note 6, at 67 ("Because of the plaintiff's onerous
new burden of proof, litigation challenging discriminatory voting practices under the
Constitution and section 2 dried up.").
53. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1998).
54. 478 U.S. 30 (1986).
55. Also referred to as the "Gingles factors."
56. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 50.
57. Id. at 51.
58. Id. The legislative history of section 2, particularly the Senate Report, indi-
cates that a "variety of factors, depending upon the kind of rule, practice, or proce-
dure called into question," are relevant in determining if a plan "results" in
discrimination. S. REP. No. 97-417, at 28-29 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N.
206-07. Typical factors include:
1. the extent of any history of official discrimination in the state or polit-
ical subdivision that touched the right of the members of the minority group
to register, to vote, or otherwise participate in the democratic process;
2. the extent to which voting in the elections of the state or political subdi-
vision is racially polarized;
3. the extent to which the state or political subdivision has used unusually
large election districts, majority vote requirements, anti-single shot provi-
sions, or other voting practices or procedures that may enhance the opportu-
nity for discrimination against the minority group;
4. if there is a candidate slating process, whether the members of the mi-
nority group have been denied access to that process;
1998]
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"racial and ethnic cleavages ... necessitate majority-minority dis-
tricts to ensure equal political and electoral opportunity," the rem-
edy is race-conscious districting.5 9
Under Section 5 of the VRA, covered jurisdictions must submit
their election plans for preclearance to the Department of Justice
or the District Court for the District of Columbia to illustrate that
they neither abridge the minority vote nor dilute minority voting
power in violation of Section 2.60 To obtain preclearance, the De-
partment of Justice encourages states to "maximize" minority vot-
ing power by creating majority-minority districts.61 The purpose of
Section 5, according to the Supreme Court's interpretation in Beer
v. United States,62 is to ensure that no changes in voting laws "lead
to a retrogression in the position of racial minorities with respect to
their effective exercise of the electoral franchise. '63
II. Redistricting under the VRA and Tension with the EPC
The Supreme Court initially deferred to states when analyzing
the creation of majority-minority voting districts.64 The Court
found no injury, under the EPC, to plaintiffs who alleged that race
was used for its own sake in drawing a majority-minority voting
5. the extent to which members of the minority group in the state or polit-
ical subdivision bear the effects of discrimination in such areas as education,
employment and health, which hinder their ability to participate effectively
in the political process;
6. whether political campaigns have been characterized by overt or subtle
racial appeals;
7. the extent to which members of the minority group have been elected
to public office in the jurisdiction.
Id. This list is referred to as the "Senate Factors," and is relied on by courts applying
the "totality of the circumstances" test set forth in section 2 of the VRA. Gingles, 478
U.S. at 37; see supra note 12.
59. Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1020 (1994).
60. Section 5 requires that covered jurisdictions submit redistricting plans to the
Attorney General for preclearance before they can enforce the plans. 42 U.S.C.
§ 1973c. If the Attorney General denies preclearance, states may attempt to obtain a
declaratory judgment granting preclearance from the federal district court for the Dis-
trict of Columbia, or they may petition that court before requesting preclearance from
the Attorney General. Id. Section 5 requirements apply to "any voting qualification
or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting
." 42 U.S.C. § 1973c, as amended.
61. See, e.g., Johnson v. Miller ("Johnson I"), 864 F. Supp. 1354, 1361 (S.D. Ga.
1994) (stating that the Department of Justice encouraged states to maximize the
number of majority-Black districts); Vera v. Richards, 861 F. Supp. 1304, 1345 (S.D.
Tex. 1994).
62. 425 U.S. 130 (1976).
63. Id. at 141; see supra note 13.
64. See, e.g., United Jewish Organizations v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144 (1977).
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district.65 In Shaw v. Reno and its progeny, however, the Court has
transformed voting rights litigation by applying strict scrutiny anal-
ysis to majority-minority voting districts and then striking them
down on equal protection grounds.66
A. Initial Deference to the VRA
In deciding whether to approve reapportionment plans, the De-
partment of Justice67 interpreted the Beer nondilution requirement
as imposing an affirmative duty on states to maximize minority vot-
ing strength and to create majority-minority districts. 6  The
Supreme Court implicitly approved such actions in United Jewish
Organizations v. Carey (" UJO")69 when it upheld New York's in-
tentional use of race to enhance minority representation in the
state legislature. Three of the eight participating justices in UJO
found that the intentional use of race was not unconstitutional if
the state neither intended nor accomplished vote dilution v.7  More-
over, the UJO plurality held that a state could consider race when
districting to satisfy the requirements of the VRA. 71 As a result,
65. Id. at 154 n.14 (stating that petitioners argue "that the history of the area dem-
onstrates that there could be-and in fact was-no reason other than race to divide
the community at this time.").
66. See supra notes 9-11 and accompanying text.
67. See supra note 60 and accompanying text (explaining that states may obtain
preclearance of their redistricting plan from the Attorney General rather than a fed-
eral court).
68. See, e.g., Johnson 1, 864 F. Supp. 1354, 1393 (S.D. Ga. 1994). See supra note 61
and accompanying text.
69. 430 U.S. 144 (1977). In UJO, a New York redistricting plan was submitted to
the Attorney General, pursuant to section 5, who objected to it because the plan
appeared to dilute the vote of minorities, specifically Blacks and Puerto Ricans. See
id. at 148-50. State officials responded to this objection by redrawing the district lines,
whereby the percentage of minority voters in districts where minorities already consti-
tuted a majority increased substantially. See id. at 151. The Attorney General did not
object to the new plan, but a group of Hasidic Jews sued, alleging that their vote had
been diluted by the new plan. See id. at 152. Moreover, they alleged that there was
"no reason other than race" that the community was divided at the time. Id. at 154
n.14; see supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text.
70. Id. at 165 (opinion of Justice White, joined by then-Justice Rehnquist and Jus-
tice Stevens) (finding that the plan, by deliberately drawing nonWhite districts, did
not minimize or unfairly cancel out White voting strength, because under the con-
tested redistricting plan, Whites continued to be fairly represented relative to their
share of the population).
71. UJO, 430 U.S. at 155-65 (opinion of Justice White, joined by Justices Brennan,
Blackmun, and Stevens). As Justice White observed, "[w]here it occurs, voting for or
against a candidate because of his race is an unfortunate practice. But it is not rare
.... It does not follow, however, that the State is powerless to minimize the conse-
quences of racial discrimination by voters when it is regularly practiced at the polls."
Id. at 166-67.
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the UJO Court created a highly deferential standard under which
plaintiffs would have difficulty proving that a state redistricting
plan, approved by the Department of Justice as consistent with the
requirements of the VRA, violated the Fourteenth Amendment.72
B. Shaw v. Reno and its Progeny
1. Shaw I: The Supreme Court Applies Strict Scrutiny to a
Majority-Minority Redistricting Plan
Although some commentators consider the Voting Rights Act to
be the most important and successful civil rights bill ever passed,73
criticism of the statute has increased dramatically in recent years. 4
Critics of the VRA allege that the race-conscious remedies in vote
dilution litigation75 violate the notion that the Constitution is color-
blind.76
The Supreme Court appeared to agree with these critics in Shaw
177 when it departed from the lenient standard it created in UJO
and created a new cause of action under the EPC.78 In a five-to-
four decision, the Shaw I Court stated that, regardless of motiva-
tion, where a legislative redistricting plan is "so extremely irregular
on its face that it rationally can be viewed only as an effort to seg-
regate the races for purposes of voting," it must undergo the same
72. Id.
73. See Davidson & Grofman, supra note 4, at 386.
74. See Grofman, supra note 44, at 1247 ("But there can be little doubt that, since
the mid-1980s, there has been a backlash against the Voting Rights Act.").
75. See id. at 1248. See, e.g., Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 42-61 (1986) (not-
ing that states must consider race because they must ensure that their redistricting
plan does not scatter minorities among majority-white districts, thus diluting minority
voting power); UJO, 430 U.S. at 167-68 (permitting the consideration of race when
redrawing the lines of voting districts).
76. Grofman, supra note 44, at 1248. The concept of a color-blind Constitution
first arose in Justice Harlan's dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896)
("Our Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citi-
zens.") (Harlan, J., dissenting). See also Shaw I, 509 U.S. 630, 657 (1993) ("Racial
gerrymandering, even for remedial purposes, may balkanize us into competing racial
factions; it threatens to carry us further from the goal of a political system in which
race no longer matters-a goal that the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments em-
body, and to which the Nation continues to aspire."). In some cases, however, the
Court has been willing to accept race-conscious remedies. See, e.g., United States v.
Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 185-86 (1987) (affirming court-ordered quota imposed to rem-
edy public employer's past discrimination); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S.
275 (1986) (noting that a public employer may voluntarily use a race-conscious plan to
remedy past racial discrimination by that public employer).
77. 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
78. UJO was substantially narrowed by the Court's decision in Shaw I. See infra
notes 81-83 and accompanying text.
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strict scrutiny applied when other state laws classify citizens by
race.
79
The Shaw I Court stated that bizarrely shaped districts lack
traditional districting principles and therefore raise an inference of
unconstitutional racial discrimination.80 Moreover, the Court dis-
tinguished UJO as a vote dilution case 81 and emphasized that redis-
tricting legislation that classifies citizens on the basis of race
involves a different, "special" type of injury, which eliminates the
need for the plaintiffs to establish vote dilution or deprivation. 82
The Court found that "a racial gerrymander may exacerbate the
very patterns of racial bloc voting that majority-minority districting
is sometimes said to counteract. 83
Although the majority expressed no view as to whether the in-
tentional creation of majority-minority districts would always give
rise to an equal protection cause of action,84 it nonetheless in-
structed that, once plaintiffs successfully prove that a state legisla-
ture racially gerrymandered its congressional redistricting plan,
courts should review the plan with "close judicial scrutiny."85 This
strict scrutiny standard requires that a state offer sufficient proof
79. Shaw I, 509 U.S. at 641-47. The Shaw I case arose when the North Carolina
legislature developed a redistricting plan which created new congressional voting dis-
tricts to reflect population increases indicated in the 1990 census. See id. at 633-34.
The Attorney General objected to the plan, pursuant to section 5, noting that the
addition of another majority-minority district would prevent dilution of the minority
vote, and that the drawing of such a district was feasible. See id. at 634-35. The legis-
lature thus created a new plan, adding a second majority-minority district, which
gained the approval of the Attorney General, but also generated much controversy.
See id. at 635-36.
80. Id. at 646-47. Traditional districting principles include "compactness, contigu-
ity, and respect for political subdivisions." Id. at 647. "We emphasize that these crite-
ria are important not because they are constitutionally required-they are not-but
because they are objective factors that may serve to defeat a claim that a district has
been gerrymandered on racial lines." Id. at 646 (citations omitted).
81. Id. at 652. But see UJO, 430 U.S. 144, 154 n.14 (1977) (alleging that there was
"no reason other than race" that the community was divided at the time, a Shaw I-
type equal protection challenge).
82. Shaw 1, 509 U.S. at 649-50 ("Classifying citizens by race, as we have said,
threatens special harms that are not present in our vote-dilution cases.").
83. Id. at 648.
84. See id. at 649. Similarly, the Court expressed no view whether the creation of
majority-minority districts to comply with the VRA is a compelling state interest be-
cause, in this case, the statute did not require such a district to be drawn. See id. at
653-54.
85. Id. at 657. For a discussion of the two-step analysis that courts must apply
when examining state actions under the EPC, see supra notes 27-31 and accompany-
ing text.
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that it narrowly tailored its redistricting plan to satisfy a compelling
governmental interest. 86
2. Miller v. Johnson: The Supreme Court Expands its Holding in
Shaw I
After Shaw I, courts split widely when interpreting what consti-
tutes a compelling governmental interest and how a state could
narrowly tailor a redistricting plan to achieve that interest.8 7
Courts also disagreed when interpreting the plaintiffs' burden of
proof in cases alleging that race-conscious redistricting plans vio-
lated the EPC. In particular, the courts disagreed on the degree of
race consciousness that would trigger strict scrutiny.88
In Miller v. Johnson,89 the Supreme Court attempted to resolve
the uncertainty created by Shaw L It held that if the plaintiff could
establish, through either direct or circumstantial evidence, 90 that
"race was the predominant factor motivating the legislature's deci-
sion to place a significant number of voters within or without a
86. See Shaw 1, 509 U.S. at 658; see also supra note 28 and accompanying text.
87. See, e.g., Vera v. Richards, 861 F. Supp. 1304, 1339-41 (S.D. Tex. 1994) (holding
that the legislature did not narrowly tailor the districts to achieve a compelling inter-
est because there was evidence of oddly-shaped boundaries); Johnson 1, 864 F. Supp.
1354, 1393 (S.D. Ga. 1994) (finding that compliance with the VRA might be compel-
ling, but holding that the state's redistricting plan was not "reasonably necessary" to
achieve compliance, because it exceeded the requirements of the Act); Shaw v. Hunt,
861 F. Supp. 408, 476 (E.D.N.C. 1994) (holding that compliance with the VRA consti-
tuted a sufficiently compelling interest that justified racially gerrymandering the vot-
ing districts); Hays v. Louisiana, 839 F. Supp. 1188, 1209 n.67 (W.D. La. 1993)
(holding that a plan creating additional majority-minority districts would be reason-
ably necessary only if a state needed to add another majority-minority district to pre-
vent a reduction of minority voting strength).
88. See, e.g., DeWitt v. Wilson, 856 F. Supp. 1409, 1413 (E.D. Cal. 1994) ("[I]n
redistricting, consciousness of race does not give rise to an [EPC] claim of racial ger-
rymandering ...."); Johnson 1, 864 F. Supp. at 1372 (holding that race must be the
"overriding, predominant force determining the lines of the district" to prove racial
gerrymandering); Vera, 861 F. Supp. at 1338 (explaining that race must be a "primary
consideration"); Hays, 839 F. Supp. at 1195 (interpreting Shaw I to require that race
need only be a tangible factor to invoke strict scrutiny). Cf Bridgeport Coalition for
Fair Representation v. City of Bridgeport, 26 F.3d 271, 278 (2d Cir. 1994) (applying
Shaw I to a city council redistricting plan, and holding that it did not trigger strict
scrutiny because race was not the city's sole motivation when designing the plan).
89. 515 U.S. 900 (1995). In Miller, the Court confronted the constitutionality of
Georgia's Eleventh Congressional District, and struck it down by yet another five-to-
four decision.
90. The Miller Court stated that "[s]hape is relevant not because bizarreness is a
necessary element of the constitutional wrong or a threshold requirement of proof,
but because it may be persuasive circumstantial evidence that race for its own sake,
and not other districting principles, was the legislature's dominant and controlling
rationale in drawing its district lines." Id. at 913.
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particular district," then the districting plan would be subject to
strict scrutiny. 9' The Miller Court stated, however, that a majority-
minority redistricting plan created to comply with the VRA could
withstand strict scrutiny, but only where there was "convincing evi-
dence" that remedial action was reasonably necessary to satisfy the
requirements of the statute. 92
Agreeing with the district court that race was the predominant
factor motivating the state legislature's drawing of Georgia's Elev-
enth Congressional District, the Miller Court addressed the re-
quirements of strict scrutiny.93 The Miller Court concluded that
the majority-minority district was not required "under a correct
reading of the [VRA]" 94 because it was part of an ameliorative ap-
portionment plan. Therefore, an additional majority-minority dis-
trict could not be compelled by Section 5 because that provision
only prohibits retrogression of minority voting rights or power.95
The Miller Court added that the Justice Department's interpreta-
tion of Section 5 as authorizing it to preclear only those reappor-
tionment plans that maximized majority-minority districts created
constitutional difficulties for Section 5 and brought the VRA "into
tension with the Fourteenth Amendment. 96
91. Id. at 916. "[A] plaintiff must prove that the legislature subordinated tradi-
tional race-neutral districting principles, including but not limited to compactness,
contiguity, respect for political subdivisions or communities defined by actual shared
interests, to racial considerations." Id.
92. Id. at 920-21.
93. See id. at 916-17.
94. Id. at 921. The Miller Court stated:
Whether or not in some cases compliance with the Voting Rights Act,
standing alone, can provide a compelling interest independent of any inter-
est in remedying past discrimination, it cannot do so here. As we suggested
in Shaw [I], compliance with federal antidiscrimination laws cannot justify
race-based districting where the challenged district was not reasonably nec-
essary under a constitutional reading and application of those laws.
Id. The Court noted, however, that a compelling state interest existed when a state
attempted to "eradicat[e] the effects of past racial discrimination." Id. at 920 (citing
Shaw 1, 113 S. Ct. at 2831). But in this case, the defendants did not argue "that it
created the [majority-minority] district to remedy past discrimination ...." Id.
95. See id. at 923; see also supra note 63 and accompanying text.
96. Id. at 927. Moreover, the Court stated that "[t]here is no indication Congress
intended such a far-reaching application of § 5, so we reject the Justice Department's
interpretation of the statute and avoid the constitutional problems that interpretation
raises." Id.; see supra note 61 and accompanying text.
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3. Muddy Waters: The Supreme Court Decisions in Shaw II and
Bush v. Vera
The Miller Court did not decide whether compliance with the
Voting Rights Act constituted a compelling governmental interest.
Moreover, it did not specify in which instances a state may draw
majority-minority districts to remedy potential or adjudicated vio-
lations of Section 2 of the VRA. In its 1995 Term, the Supreme
Court struck down majority-minority congressional districts in
North Carolina97 and Texas.98 The Court, however, did not specify
the constitutional parameters of drawing boundaries to improve
representation for minorities who have been historically shut out.
In Shaw II, North Carolina sought to prove three compelling
state interests to sustain its contested minority-controlled congres-
sional district: (1) to eradicate the effects of past and present dis-
crimination; (2) to comply with Section 5 of the VRA; and (3) to
comply with Section 2 of the VRA.99 Although the Court recog-
nized that a state's interest in remedying the effects of past or pres-
ent racial discrimination may justify a government's use of racial
distinctions, it pointed out that for the interest to rise to a compel-
ling level it must be specifically identified. 100
As in Miller, the Shaw II Court did not reach the question of
whether compliance with the VRA, standing alone, was a compel-
ling interest. It found that an additional majority-minority con-
gressional district was not necessary under a correct reading of the
statute, and thus it was not a narrowly tailored remedy. 10 In re-
jecting North Carolina's Section 5 defense, the Court noted that
the same Justice Department policy of maximizing the number of
majority-Black districts that was rejected in Miller was present in
this case. 0 2 With respect to the state's Section 2 defense, the Court
held that the majority-minority district could not remedy any po-
tential Section 2 violation because "no one .. .could reasonably
suggest that the district contains a 'geographically compact' popu-
lation of any race."' 03
97. Shaw v. Hunt ("Shaw II"), 116 S. Ct. 1894 (1996).
98. Bush v. Vera, 116 S. Ct. 1941 (1996).
99. See Shaw 11, 116 S. Ct. at 1902.
100. See id. at 1902-03 ("[A]n effort to alleviate the effects of societal discrimina-
tion is not a compelling interest.").
101. See id.
102. See id. at 1904 (citations omitted); see also supra note 96 and accompanying
text.
103. Id. at 1906 (citations omitted); see supra note 56 and accompanying text.
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In Shaw HI's companion case, Bush v. Vera, Justice O'Connor
delivered a plurality opinion for the Court which applied strict
scrutiny to three newly-created majority-minority districts in
Texas.1 0 4 With utter disregard for traditional redistricting princi-
ples, the state formed these districts, whose contours were unex-
plainable in terms other than race.105 In rejecting the state's
defense that it drew the minority-controlled districts to comply
with VRA requirements, the Court "assume[d] without deciding
that compliance with the results test [of Section 2] can be a compel-
ling state interest,"' 6 but found that the districts' bizarre shape and
lack of compactness defeated any claim that they were narrowly
tailored. 10 7
Justice O'Connor also filed a significant concurring opinion,
however, to express her view that the state interest in avoiding lia-
bility under Section 2 of the VRA is compelling.10 8 Moreover, she
would have held that "[i]f a state has a strong basis in evidence for
concluding that the Gingles factors are present," and creates a ma-
jority-minority "district that 'substantially addresses' the potential
liability ... and does not deviate substantially from a hypothetical
court-drawn § 2 district for predominantly racial reasons, . . . its
districting plan will be deemed narrowly tailored."109
Although Justice O'Connor concluded that Section 2 does not
require a non-compact majority-minority district," 0 Justice Ken-
nedy observed in his concurrence, "neither does [Section.2] forbid
it, provided that the rationale for creating it is proper in the first
instance.""' Justice Kennedy also noted that "[d]istricts not drawn
104. See Bush, 116 S. Ct. at 1958-60
105. See id.
106. Id. at 1960.
107. See id. at 1960-61. The Court noted, however, that "[a] § 2 district that is rea-
sonably compact and regular, taking into account traditional districting principles
such as maintaining communities of interest and traditional boundaries, may pass
strict scrutiny without having to defeat rival compact districts ... in endless 'beauty
contests."' Id. at 1960 (emphasis in original).
108. See id. at 1968 (O'Connor, J., concurring); see also id. at 1989 (Stevens, J.,
joined by Ginsburg and Breyer, JJ., dissenting); id. at 2007 (Souter, J., joined by Gins-
burg and Breyer, JJ., dissenting).
109. Id. at 1970.
110. See id. ("[D]istricts that are bizarrely shaped and non-compact, and that other-
wise neglect traditional districting principles and deviate substantially from the hypo-
thetical court-drawn district, for predominantly racial reasons, are unconstitutional.").
111. Id. at 1972 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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for impermissible reasons or according to impermissible criteria
may take any shape, even a bizarre one. ' 112
C. Lower Court Reactions to Miller, Shaw II, and Bush
As a result of the Supreme Court's decisions in Miller, Shaw II,
and Bush, lower courts have applied strict scrutiny to strike down
majority-minority districts after finding that race was the predomi-
nant factor in drawing the district's boundaries. 113 District courts
also have rejected new challenges to majority-minority voting dis-
tricts while attempting to conform their decisions with the analyti-
cal framework established in Shaw I and its progeny." 4 In what
may be an unanticipated consequence, however, some courts have
required plaintiffs in Section 2 vote dilution cases to show that
112. Id. Justice Kennedy also observed, that "[t]he first Gingles condition refers to
the compactness of the minority population, not the compactness of the contested
district." Id. at 1971.
113. See, e.g., Diaz v. Silver, 978 F. Supp. 96, 117 (E.D.N.Y. 1997) (declaring the
mostly Hispanic Twelfth Congressional District in New York unconstitutional, after
applying strict scrutiny, because race and ethnicity were the dominant factors used to
draw it); Moon v. Meadows, 952 F. Supp. 1141, 1151 (E.D. Va. 1997) (striking down a
majority-minority congressional district as unconstitutional racial gerrymander be-
cause the state subordinated traditional districting principles to accomplish its goal of
a safe Black district); Smith v. Beasley, 946 F. Supp. 1174, 1210-11 (D.S.C. 1996)
(striking down, on equal protection grounds, majority-minority state legislative dis-
tricts because state failed to prove that districts at issue were specifically drawn to
achieve a compelling state interest in remedying effects of past or present discrimina-
tion, and the districts were not narrowly tailored to remedy any potential section 2
violation or to avoid retrogression as prohibited by section 5); Hays v. Louisiana, 936
F. Supp. 360 (W.D. La. 1996) (holding Miller to be commanding precedent, and strik-
ing down a majority-minority district as a racial gerrymander that could not be
demonstrated to be narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling governmental interest).
114. See, e.g., Theriot v. Parish of Jefferson, 966 F. Supp. 1435, 1449-50 (E.D. La.
1997) (holding that strict scrutiny was not warranted because changes in district con-
figuration were driven primarily by politics); King v. State Bd. of Elections ("King I"),
979 F. Supp. 582 (N.D. I11. 1996), vacated, 117 S. Ct. 429 (1996). In King I, a three-
member panel of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois held
Illinois' Chicago-based Fourth Congressional District, the first Hispanic-majority con-
gressional district in the Midwest, to be constitutional, despite its "extraordinary"
shape, because it was justified under the VRA. 979 F. Supp. at 616-17. The Supreme
Court, however, set aside the King I opinion and ordered the Federal District Court
in Chicago to reconsider its decision in light of the Court's rulings in Shaw H and
Bush. 117 S. Ct. 429 (1996); see also Linda Greenhouse, Setback for Hispanic Con-
gressional District, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13, 1996, at A4. On remand, a three-judge panel
held that the Fourth Congressional District was narrowly tailored to remedying a po-
tential violation of or achieving compliance with the VRA and, therefore did not vio-




their districting plan comports with Shaw I and its progeny in order
to satisfy the first Gingles precondition.115
1. What Compactness is Required?
Some post-Miller/Bush courts have dismissed Section 2 claims
because the plaintiffs could not show that the majority-minority
district they would create was compact enough to survive an equal
protection challenge. 116 Other courts have opined that it is a mis-
take to conflate the Gingles threshold requirement of a geographi-
cally compact minority population with the principle of
compactness of district shape which is used to assess whether racial
gerrymandering has occurred."17 The latter courts have noted that
the first Gingles factor, which requires that a minority group be
sufficiently compact to constitute a majority in a single member
district,118 is an inquiry into causation that necessarily classifies vot-
ers by their race. 119 In Miller, however, compactness was merely
one of many factors whose presence bore on the ultimate question
of whether race was the predominant factor motivating the draw-
115. See, e.g., Milwaukee Branch of the N.A.A.C.P. v. Thompson, 935 F. Supp.
1419, 1424-25 (E.D. Wis. 1996) (finding that a proposed remedy under section 2 that
departs from traditional redistricting principles solely to create a majority-Black dis-
trict is impermissible under the Gingles standard), aftd, 116 F.3d 1194 (7th Cir. 1997),
petition for cert. filed, 66 U.S.L.W. 3338 (U.S. Oct 31, 1997) (No. 97-753); Reed v.
Town of Babylon, 914 F. Supp. 843, 871 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) (finding that a plaintiff seek-
ing to meet its burden of showing compactness under the first Gingles precondition
should not be permitted to rely on a plan that would have no chance of being found to
be narrowly tailored to redress the violation).
116. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
117. See, e.g., Clark v. Calhoun County, 88 F.3d 1393, 1406 (5th Cir. 1996); King I,
979 F. Supp. at 614. For example, in King I, the panel noted that the question raised
by Gingles is whether the minority population (and not the district drawn to accom-
modate that population) is geographically compact and sufficiently numerous to con-
stitute a majority in a single member district. See 979 F. Supp. at 614. By contrast, the
King I court determined that there is a second measure of compactness (i.e., a tradi-
tional race-neutral districting principle) that concerns whether a district drawn to
remedy a section 2 violation satisfies the requirements of the EPC, and to conflate the
two into a single measurement confuses the liability with the damages analysis, and
represents an unwarranted extension of Shaw L See id. Similarly, the Clark court
found that Bush and Shaw II support the conclusion that Miller's emphasis on pur-
pose does not apply to the first Gingles factor because in neither case did the Court
suggest that a district drawn for predominantly racial reasons would necessarily fail
the Gingles test. See Clark, 88 F.3d at 1406-07.
118. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
119. See, e.g., Clark, 88 F.3d at 1406-07. Moreover, the Clark court ruled that to the
extent that the plaintiffs' proposed remedy to the Section 2 violation may have to
survive an equal protection challenge, and show that race was not used at the expense
of traditional political concerns any more than reasonably necessary, that remedy was
not ripe for review at the liability stage. See id. at 1407-08.
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ing of particular district lines.12 ° Moreover, the Supreme Court has
never provided clear guidance for determing what "compact"
means or how the analysis regarding district shape should interre-
late with the inquiry that focuses on population.
2. The Plot Thickens: A Redistricting Plan, Compelled by Miller,
That Reduces the Number of Majority-Minority Districts
is Challenged under the VRA
In Miller, the Supreme Court declared Georgia's Eleventh Con-
gressional District unconstitutional.' 21 As a result of this decision,
the Miller plaintiffs also successfully challenged Georgia's Second
Congressional District, based on proof that the majority-minority
district contravened the EPC because it was drawn to segregate
voters according to their race.1 22 As to the remedy, the Georgia
district court initially deferred to the Georgia legislature, allowing
it an opportunity to draw a new congressional map. 2 3 When the
legislature was unable to redraw the map and adjourned, however,
it effectively left the task to the district court.124
The district court devised a plan that reduced Georgia's major-
ity-minority congressional districts from three to one.'25 Although
the district court considered the possibility of creating a second
majority-minority district, it concluded that to do so would
subordinate Georgia's traditional districting policies by considering
race predominantly.126 Moreover, the district court found that Sec-
tion 2 did not require it to create a second majority-minority dis-
trict in Georgia because of the "geographic dispersion of its
minority population and lack of any significant vote
polarization."127
In a five-to-four decision, the United States Supreme Court af-
firmed the Georgia district court's plan.128 One of the questions
presented to the Court was whether a court-ordered plan that frag-
ments the African-American population in two majority-Black dis-
tricts and disperses it throughout the state, thereby reducing the
number of majority-Black districts from three to one, is retrogres-
120. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
121. See supra notes 89-96 and accompanying text.
122. See Johnson v. Miller ("Johnson II"), 922 F. Supp. 1552 (S.D. Ga. 1995).
. 123. See Johnson III, 922 F. Supp. 1556, 1559 (S.D. Ga. 1995).
124. See id.
125. See id. at 1561.
126. See id. at 1566.
127. Id.
128. Abrams v. Johnson, 117 S. Ct. 1925 (1997).
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sive and dilutes Black voting strength in violation of Sections 2 and
5 of the VRA. 129
In holding that the district court's remedial redistricting plan did
not violate Section 2 of the VRA, the Abrams Court found that
none of the Gingles preconditions, 3 ° which set out the basic frame-
work for establishing a vote dilution claim, were met.13 1  The
Abrams Court also rejected the appellants' contention that the dis-
trict court plan violated Section 5 of the VRA. Specifically, it
found that the appellants' proposed benchmarks (the Georgia leg-
islature's 1991 and 1992 redistricting plans) for measuring retro-
gression were impermissible because they were never in effect and
constitutionally defective. 32
129. See Brief for Appellants at *i, Abrams v. Johnson, 116 S. Ct. 1823 (Nos. 95-
1425, 95-1460), 1996 WL 416713 (1996). The Abrams appellants argued that the
court-ordered plan violated section 2 because the alternative remedial plans submit-
ted to the district court showed that it was clearly possible to draw two reasonably
compact majority-Black congressional districts in Georgia. See id. at *43. The De-
partment of Justice submitted a proposed majority-minority district that was roughly
pear-shaped, while Abrams offered two proposals for minority-controlled districts
that were roughly wine bottle-shaped. See Paul L. McKaskle, In the U.S. Supreme
Court: The Voting Rights Act and the Scope of Shaw v. Reno, 12-9-96 WLN 13086. In
all of the appellants' proposals, however, the Black population was not contiguous,
and counties were split up, contrary to traditional districting principles in Georgia.
See id. Appellants also argued that the totality of the circumstances, including evi-
dence of past discrimination and its continuing effects, strongly supported a finding
that the court's plan would result in discrimination in violation of section 2. See Brief
for Appellants at *44 (citing Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1018 (1994)).
130. See supra notes 55-58 and accompanying text.
131. See Abrams, 117 S. Ct. at 1936 ("In fact, none of the three Gingles factors, the
threshold findings for a vote dilution claim, were established here.") (citing Bush v.
Vera, 116 S. Ct. 1941, 1959-1961 (1996)). Specifically, the Abrams Court found that
the district court did not commit a clear error when it determined that the Black
population was not sufficiently compact for a second majority-Black district and, thus,
the first Gingles factor was not satisfied. See id. Moreover, the Abrams Court found
that the district court did not clearly err in finding insufficient racial polarization,
given the evidence of significant White crossover voting, to meet the second and third
Gingles factors. See id. at 1936-37. The Court particularly noted the results of the
1996 general elections in which all three Black incumbents won elections under the
court plan, two in majority-White districts running against White candidates. See id.
at 1937.
132. See id. at 1938-39. The Abrams Court, in fact, agreed with the district court
that the 1982 plan, in effect for a decade, was the appropriate benchmark, and found
that the appellants did not show that Black voters suffered a retrogression in their
voting strength under the court plan measured against the 1982 plan. See id. at 1939.
Moreover, the Court rejected appellants' assertion that, even using the 1982 plan as a
benchmark, the district court's plan was retrogressive because under the 1982 plan
one of the ten districts was majority-Black, while under the district court's plan one of
eleven districts was majority-Black. See id. ("Under that logic, each time a State with
a majority-minority district was allowed to add one new district because of population
1998]
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXV
The dissent in Abrams primarily complained that the majority
decision departed dramatically from the Georgia legislature's pref-
erence for two majority-minority districts, which the district court
was not free to disregard. 133 The Abrams dissenters also disagreed
with the majority's conclusion that Sections 2 and 5 of the VRA
did not require a second majority-minority district in Georgia.13 4
Finally, the Abrams dissent argued that the majority decision exac-
erbated the concern that Shaw I and its progeny-particularly, the
"predominant racial motive" test135-improperly would shift redis-
tricting authority from legislatures to courts and prevent the legiti-
mate use of race as a redistricting factor.136
III. Erecting a Safety Net for Redistricting's
"Tightrope Walkers"
The Supreme Court should clarify the relationship between its
new equal protection cause of action and the requirements of the
Voting Rights Act because they are in tension, sending conflicting
messages to legislators, litigants, and courts involved in the redis-
tricting process.
growth, it would have to be majority-minority. This the Voting Rights Act does not
require.").
133. See Abrams, 117 S. Ct. at 1943 (Breyer, J., joined by Stevens, Souter, and
Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting) (citing Upham v. Seamon, 456 U.S. 37, 43 (1982)). In
Upham, the Supreme Court ruled that a district court drawing congressional districts
is "not free to disregard the political program of the ... Legislature." 456 U.S. at 43.
134. See id. at 1946. Specifically, the Abrams dissent suggested that the district
court improperly analyzed the "compactness" of the proposed majority-minority dis-
tricts by conflating Shaw I and its progeny compactness, which concerns the shape or
boundaries of a district, with section 2 compactness, which concerns a minority groups
compactness. Id. at 1947. For a discussion of the confusion among the lower courts
regarding the proper "compactness" analysis, see supra Part II.C.1. The dissenters
also found Georgia's discriminatory history and the fact that African-American repre-
sentatives have come almost exclusively from majority-minority districts strongly sup-
port the existence of racially polarized voting, despite the fact that the African-
American incumbents were reelected in the 1996 general elections. See Abrams, 117
S. Ct. at 1947 (Breyer, J., joined by Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting).
Moreover, the dissent argued that the question of whether the evidence showed that
the failure to create a second majority-minority would violate section 2 of the VRA
never needed to be answered because the proper question is "whether the evidence is
strong enough to justify a legislature's reasonable belief that that was so." Id. at 1948
("A legal rule that permits legislatures to take account of race only when § 2 really
requires them to do so is a rule that shifts the power to redistrict from legislatures to
federal courts (for only the latter can say what § 2 really requires).").
135. Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 917 (1995); see supra note 92 and accompany-
ing text.
136. Abrams, 117 S. Ct. at 1949 ("Thus, given today's suit, a legislator might reason-
ably wonder whether he can ever knowingly place racial minorities in a district .... ").
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A. Tension Between the Shaw Equal Protection Analysis and
the Requirements of the VRA
Congress created the Voting Rights Act to enforce the Four-
teenth and Fifteenth Amendments by eradicating the continued
discrimination against minority groups in the voting process and
ensuring that minorities were not denied their constitutional right
to vote. 137 For three decades after the VRA, the Supreme Court's
principal concern with respect to the role of race in representation
was vote dilution, resulting in great deference to the VRA. 138 With
the recent decisions in Shaw I and its progeny, however, the Court
has developed a new, analytically distinct, approach to race and
representation that analyzes majority-minority congressional dis-
tricts with strict scrutiny, under the Equal Protection Clause, if
traditional districting principles are subordinated to race.139
The two approaches are in tension because, while the remedy to
Section 2 vote dilution is the adoption of majority-minority dis-
tricts,140 racially motivated districting is subject to strict scrutiny by
the Supreme Court.14' The Court, however, makes assumptions
about the place of race in politics that are at odds with the neces-
sary precondition of vote dilution litigation: that voting is racially
polarized. 4 2 Unfortunately, the Court's laudable goal of removing
race from politics conflicts with the finding in many vote dilution
cases that race plays a significant role in politics through the deci-
137. See, e.g., South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 315 (1996) ("The Voting
Rights Act of 1965 reflects Congress' firm intention to rid the country of racial dis-
crimination in voting."). See supra Part I.B.
138. See Richard Briffault, Race and Representation After Miller v. Johnson, 1995
U. CHi. LEGAL F. 23, 23 (1995); see also supra Part II.A.
139. See supra Part II.B. For an interesting and original article positing the creation
of majority-minority United States Senate districts, see Terry Smith, Rediscovering the
Sovereignty of the People: The Case for Senate Districts, 75 N.C. L. REV. 1, 60 (1996)
("Whatever may be the effects of Shaw and its progeny on majority-minority House
districts, these precedents do not preclude the creation of majority-minority or minor-
ity enhanced Senate districts, for such districts can be drawn in accordance with tradi-
tional districting criteria."); see also Jeanmarie K. Grubert, Note, The Rehnquist
Court's Changed Reading of the Equal Protection Clause in the Context of Voting
Rights, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1819, 1821 (1997) (arguing that racial classifications that
benefit a racial minority are constitutionally permissible under the EPC).
140. See Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1019-20 (1994); see also supra note 59
and accompanying text.
141. See supra Part II.B.
142. See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 50-51; see also supra notes 54-58 and
accompanying text.
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sions of voters. 43 Thus, the Court's new approach forces govern-
ments to be color-blind when voters are not.
1. Redistricting's Catch-22
By considering racially motivated actions that increase the repre-
sentation of racial minorities to be as problematic as actions that
decrease minority political strength, the Supreme Court presents
state legislatures with a Catch-22. When states create majority-mi-
nority districts to satisfy Sections 2 and 5 of the VRA, which re-
quire that the legislature consider minority voters when drawing
district lines,' their redistricting plan is vulnerable to constitu-
tional attack on equal protection grounds. How states can comply
with the VRA and avoid violating the EPC remains unclear, as
race almost always predominates when states reapportion their
electoral districts to comply with the federal statute.
2. The Supreme Court's Implicit Challenge of Vote
Dilution Doctrine
Shaw v. Reno and its progeny do not directly challenge the vote
dilution doctrine. The Supreme Court still permits the use of race
to eradicate the effects of past racial discrimination, and allows ju-
risdictions to use race to comply with the VRA.145 Regardless of
the merits of the Court's new approach to redistricting in cases
where the plaintiffs do not allege vote dilution, to the extent that
Shaw I and its progeny compel strict scrutiny of electoral districts
drawn pursuant to Section 2 of the VRA, the Court unnecessarily
intrudes on the vote dilution doctrine pronounced in Thornburg v.
Gingles.1
46
In Gingles, the Supreme Court established a comprehensive
framework for analyzing vote dilution claims. An essential re-
quirement under the Gingles analysis is that a minority group be
able to show that it is "sufficiently large and geographically com-
143. See, e.g., Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613, 616-17 (1982); see also KEITH REEVES,
VOTING HOPES OR FEARS? 100 (1997) ("In the entire checkered history of this coun-
try, only nine blacks have ever won election to the U.S. Congress from districts where
whites were overwhelmingly in the majority."); supra note 21 and accompanying text.
144. See supra Part I.B for a discussion of VRA requirements under sections 2 and
5.
145. See, e.g., Shaw II, 116 S. Ct. 1894, 1902-03 (1996); Bush v. Vera, 116 S. Ct. 1941,
1960-61 (1996); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 920-21 (1995); Shaw 1, 509 U.S. 630,
653-56 (1993); see supra Part II.B.
146. 478 U.S. 30 (1986); see supra notes 54-58 and accompanying text.
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pact to constitute a majority in a single-member district. '147 In
Shaw I and its progeny, a district's lack of compactness has been a
major factor for the Court, in deciding both whether to apply strict
scrutiny and whether the majority-minority district can survive
heightened judicial review.148 If a minority group has established a
vote dilution claim under Gingles, however, a court should not in-
quire further into the compactness of a district's shape, and the
motivations behind it, because the group already has shown its
numerosity and geographic compactness.
Moreover, a finding of a Section 2 violation under Gingles is
causally related to the fact that the minority group is geographi-
cally compact and constitutes a politically cohesive unit, though the
White majority votes sufficiently as a bloc to defeat the minority's
preferred candidate.1 49 A finding of vote dilution under Gingles
also is causally related to racially adverse social and historical con-
ditions, including the history of an electoral system's past discrimi-
nation.1 50  Therefore, once a plaintiff establishes a Section 2
violation under the Gingles framework, the Court's equal protec-
tion concerns, regarding the constitutionality of a majority-minor-
ity district drawn with race as the predominant motive, are
satisfied. Thus, a Shaw I-type strict scrutiny review of that district
represents an implicit challenge of the vote dilution doctrine.
B. Abrams v. Johnson: A Missed Opportunity for the Supreme
Court to Resolve Tension and Permit the EPC and
VRA to Coexist in Harmony
To resolve the tension between its equal protection analysis in
Shaw v. Reno and its progeny, and the requirements of the VRA,
the Supreme Court should have used Abrams v. Johnson151 to clar-
ify both the contours of vote dilution claims, and how majority-
minority districts (as remedies to violations of Section 2 of the
VRA) can survive strict scrutiny. By failing to explain the scope
and limits of Shaw I and its progeny, the Court has delayed the
resolution of important issues, leaving state legislatures and private
147. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 50; see supra note 56 and accompanying text.
148. See supra Part II.B.
149. See Gingles, 478 U.S. at 51; see also supra notes 56-58 and accompanying text.
150. The history of official discrimination in the state or political subdivision affect-
ing the minority group's ability to participate in the democratic process is part of the
"totality of the circumstances" analysis courts use to determine if a section 2 violation
exists once the Gingles preconditions are established. See supra note 58.
151. 117 S. Ct. 1925 (1997). See supra Part II.C.2 for a discussiofi of the Abrams
litigation.
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litigants to question whether the creation of majority-minority vot-
ing districts, pursuant to the VRA, are constitutional under the
EPC.
1. Majority-Minority Districts, Drawn to Comply with the VRA,
Can Survive Strict Scrutiny
One of the most significant issues the Abrams Court should have
resolved is whether compliance with Section 2 of the VRA consti-
tutes a compelling state interest permitting the creation of minor-
ity-controlled districts. The outcome of this question likely
depends on Justice O'Connor, who represents the swing vote in the
Shaw v. Reno line of cases.
In Bush v. Vera, Justice O'Connor, the author of the plurality
opinion, also wrote a very important separate concurring opinion,
where she expressed her view that compliance with the results test
of Section 2 is a compelling state interest. 152 Because the four
Bush dissenters also determined that a majority-minority congres-
sional district, drawn to avoid liability under the VRA, serves a
compelling interest, 53 Justice O'Connor could have provided the
determinative vote for a holding that a second minority-controlled
district in Georgia was compelled by the VRA, and thus was con-
stitutional regardless of racial motivation.
Logic supports such a result. Strict scrutiny should not outlaw a
race-based remedy to a violation of the VRA, because the statute
compels race-based districting when there is a violation of Section
2.151 If the Supreme Court will not recognize race-conscious dis-
tricting as constitutional under the EPC, then it must be prepared
to strike down the VRA itself as unconstitutional. However, con-
sidering congressional intent,'55 for. the Court to find that the VRA
152. 116 S. Ct. 1941, 1968 (1996) (O'Connor, J., concurring); see supra note 108 and
accompanying text.
153. See id. at 1989 (Stevens, J., joined by Ginsburg and Breyer, JJ., dissenting); see
also id. at 2007 (Souter, J., joined by Ginsburg and Breyer, JJ., dissenting); supra note
107 and accompanying text.
154. See Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1020 (1994). "[A]dherence to Gingles
to remedy violations of Section 2 necessarily implicates race" because of the showing
minority groups must make in the first instance to establish the violations. Sanchez v.
Colorado, 97 F.3d 1303, 1327 (10th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1820 (1997); see
also Clark v. Calhoun County, 88 F.3d 1393, 1408 (5th Cir. 1996) ("Redistricting to
remedy found violations of § 2 of the Voting Rights Act by definition employs race.");
supra notes 54-59 and accompanying text.
155. See supra notes 37-41 and accompanying text.
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violates the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection guarantee
would be "cruelly ironic.' '1 56
2. The Meaning and Role of Compactness in Redistricting
For a majority of the Supreme Court to find that compliance
with Section 2 permits a majority-minority district drawn with race
as the predominant motive, the Justices will have to be satisfied
that the Gingles preconditions are met. Specifically, a majority of
the Court must be convinced that a majority-minority district has a
"sufficiently large and geographically compact" Black population,
and that racially polarized voting exists in the district. 57 Although
the Abrams appellants' proposals for a second majority-minority
district were roughly pear or wine bottle shaped,158 this should not
have prevented the Court from finding that a second "reasonably
compact" minority-controlled congressional district could be cre-
ated in Georgia.
In her concurrence in Bush, Justice O'Connor stated that dis-
tricts that are bizarrely-shaped and non-compact for predominantly
racial reasons are unconstitutional. 159 If Justice O'Connor meant
that an oddly shaped majority-minority district, drawn to remedy a
Section 2 violation, is presumptively unconstitutional, then her
statement reflects a mistaken view of the compactness required
under Section 2.160 Justice Kennedy asserted correctly in his con-
currence in Bush that the first Gingles factor refers to the compact-
ness of the minority population, not the contested district, and that
Section 2 does not forbid a non-compact majority-minority
district. 161
156. Bush, 116 S. Ct. at 2007 (Souter, J., dissenting).
157. See supra notes 56-58 and accompanying text.
158. See supra note 129.
159. See Bush, 116 S. Ct. at 1970 (O'Connor, J., concurring); see also supra note 110
and accompanying text.
160. Such a definition of compactness is also substantially more stringent than the
lower courts' interpretation of the Gingles compactness requirement. See Bernard
Grofman, Expert Witness Testimony and the Evolution of Voting Rights Case Law, in
COrROVERSIES, supra note 6, at 218-19 (stating that lower courts generally interpret
the compactness requirement loosely to mean only that the minority population must
be "sufficiently geographically concentrated so that a district could be created in
which the minority is a majority").
161. See Bush, 116 S. Ct. at 1971-72 (Kennedy, J., concurring); see also supra notes
111-12 and accompanying text. The Abrams dissent also asserted that it is a mistake
to conflate Shaw I and its progeny compactness, which concerns district shape or
boundaries, with section 2 compactness, which concerns a minority group's compact-
ness. See Abrams v. Johnson, 117 S. Ct. 1925, 1947 (1997) (Breyer, J., joined by Ste-
vens, Souter, and Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting); see also supra note 132.
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Justice Kennedy holds the legally principled position because it
conforms with the Supreme Court's prior decision in Gingles. Jus-
tice Kennedy's assertion also adheres to the Court's previous dec-
laration in Reynolds v. Sims that public officials "represent people,
not trees or acres. ' 162 The Court, therefore, should direct the
lower federal courts that the Section 2 compactness inquiry applies
to the geographical compactness of the minority population, while
the EPC compactness question asks whether the district drawn sub-
ordinates traditional race-neutral principles (i.e., compactness of
district shape) more than is "reasonably necessary" to satisfy the
VRA.163
Ironically, if the Court requires majority-minority districts to
have a particular shape, these districts may actually stand out in
contrast to majority-White districts that do not face such restric-
tions. 164 Moreover, the Court's recent decisions have essentially
triple-counted geographic compactness by using it to (1) decide
whether plaintiffs have shown that racial considerations
predominated, thus triggering strict scrutiny;165 (2) decide whether
minority voters could have made a prima facie showing of liability
under Section 2 of the VRA, thus establishing a potential compel-
ling interest for the challenged plan;166 and (3) decide whether the
challenged districts are narrowly tailored in that they avoid unduly
subordinating traditional districting principles, including
compactness. 67
Although the distinction between compactness of district shape,
a traditional districting principle, versus compactness of minority
population, a necessary Gingles precondition, may seem to be arti-
162. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964); see also id. at 580 ("Citizens, not
history or economic interests, cast votes. Considerations of area alone provide an
insufficient justification for deviations from the equal-population principle. Again,
people, not land or trees or pastures, vote.").
163. See supra notes 117-120 and accompanying text.
164. See Bush, 116 S. Ct. at 1990 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Pamela S. Karlan,
Still Hazy After All These Years: Voting Rights in the Post-Shaw Era, 26 CUMB. L.
REV. 287, 309 (1995-96)). Moreover, topography (mountain ranges, rivers, bays),
lines of communication and transportation, local government boundaries and the
"one person, one vote" requirement justify the departure from districts that are
nearly square in shape. See Paul L. McKaskle, The Voting Rights Act and the "Consci-
entious Redistricter", 30 U.S.F. L. REV. 1, 64 (1995).
165. See, e.g., Shaw 1, 509 U.S. 630, 641-47 (1993); see supra note 79 and accompa-
nying text.
166. See e.g., Shaw II, 116 S. Ct. 1894, 1906 (1996); see supra note 103 and accompa-
nying text.
167. See, e.g., Bush v. Vera, 116 S. Ct. 1941, 1960-61 (1996); see supra note 107 and
accompanying text.
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ficial because a geographically compact population should produce
a compact district, it already has split the lower federal courts ad-
dressing Section 2 claims (which were not even triggered by a Shaw
redistricting decision). 68 Some courts have conflated the two is-
sues of compactness and unfairly rejected Section 2 liability be-
cause the plaintiffs' proposed remedy either departed from
traditional redistricting principles or had no chance of surviving
strict scrutiny. 169 Other courts correctly have kept separate the is-
sue of Section 2 liability from the analysis of whether the proposed
remedy satisfies the requirements of the EPC.170 It is important to
keep separate the equal protection analysis of a majority-minority
district drawn to remedy a Section 2 violation from the Gingles
analysis of whether there is a violation of Section 2 in the first in-
stance, because a district drawn to avoid liability under the VRA
may be able to survive strict scrutiny even if traditional districting
principles were subordinated to race.
3. Guideposts for the Legislators, Litigants, and Courts Walking
Redistricting's Tightrope
Because the Supreme Court decided Abrams without resolving
whether majority-minority voting districts are constitutional race-
based remedies for violations of Section 2, and without clarifying
the meaning and role of compactness, it failed to relieve the ten-
sion between its equal protection analysis, under Shaw I and its
progeny, and its vote dilution doctrine. At a minimum, therefore,
the Court should provide some guideposts to future legislators and
vote dilution litigants seeking to create majority-minority districts.
For example, the Supreme Court could instruct lower courts that
majority-minority districts, drawn with race as the predominant
factor, can survive strict scrutiny if two conditions are met: (1) the
district is necessary to cure a VRA violation; and (2) the legislature
uses race as the predominant factor only after trying in good faith
to cure the violation without subordinating race to traditional dis-
tricting principles. 17 ' Although such a holding would not com-
pletely resolve the tension between the VRA and EPC, the Court
would at least demonstrate its continued commitment to the .VRA,
168. See supra Part II.C.1.
169. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
170. See supra notes 117-120 and accompanying text.
171. Cf. Dillard v. City of Greensboro, 946 F. Supp. 946, 955 (M.D. Ala. 1996)
(allowing a Special Master to use race as a predominant factor only after attempting
to draw a majority-minority district without subordinating traditional race-neutral dis-
tricting principles).
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as well as to the enforcement of its race-conscious remedies where
necessary to achieve its goals of protecting minority voting rights
and power. 172
The Supreme Court also could read a heightened compactness
requirement into its Gingles analysis, prohibiting majority-minority
districts that are non-compact in shape because they cannot survive
narrow tailoring scrutiny under equal protection analysis. 173 This
approach is inappropriate, however, because the creation of a mi-
nority-controlled district, pursuant to the VRA, is meant to estab-
lish a normal, color-blind state of affairs in a place where racially
polarized voting has subsumed minority voting rights and power.
Indeed, the compactness inquiry should be reduced where past ra-
cial discrimination is shown, because the breadth of the remedy
ought to fit the injury proven. 74
Critics of the VRA may argue that the statute already has
achieved its goals, given that all the minority candidates in districts
that were redrawn as a result of Shaw I and its progeny were re-
elected to Congress in 1996.175 One election, however, is not dis-
positive proof that minority groups are able to elect representatives
of their choice in predominantly White districts. 76 Moreover, the
success of these minority candidates in the 1996 election may more
accurately bespeak the power of incumbency.1 77 The real test of
whether majority-minority districts are still necessary will come
172. See supra Part I.B.
173. See supra notes 109-10 and accompanying text.
174. Congress has made clear that, in fashioning a remedy to a section 2 violation, a
"court should exercise its traditional equitable powers to fashion relief so that it com-
pletely remedies the prior dilution of minority voting strength and fully provides
equal opportunity for minority citizens to partcipate and elect candidates of their
choice." S. REP. No. 97-417, at 31 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177, 208.
175. Kevin Sack, Victory of 5 Redistricted Blacks Recasts Gerrymandering Dispute,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 1996, at Al.
176. See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 74-76 (1986). Indeed, the open racism
revealed in the release of the "Texaco tapes" clearly shows that discriminatory prac-
tices by the White majority in this country are still a significant problem that requires
the redress of remedial statutes. See Kurt Eichenwald, Texaco Executives, On Tape,
Discussed Impeding a Bias Suit, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 1996, at Al. Texaco executives,
recorded on tape, referred to plaintiffs in an impending employment discrimination
suit as "Black jelly beans" upset about being "glued to the bottom of the bag." Id. at
D4. Moreover, the problem of minority representation is acutely felt in the Black
community as fourteen percent of a total voting age population of 10.4 million Black
men nationwide are currently or permanently barred from voting either because they
are in prison or have been convicted of a felony. See Fox Butterfield, Many Black
Men Barred From Voting, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 1997, at A12; see also supra note 143
and accompanying text.
177. See Cynthia A. McKinney, A Product of the Voting Rights Act, WASH. POST,
Nov. 26, 1996, at A15 ("[W]ithout the ability to represent the old [majority-minority]
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from the minority candidates who vie for seats after the incum-
bents from former majority-minority districts leave office.
Conclusion
In Shaw v. Reno and its progeny, the Supreme Court has rede-
fined the voting rights debate, subjecting majority-minority dis-
tricts, drawn to comply with the VRA, to strict scrutiny under the
EPC. To resolve the conflicting demands that legislators, litigants,
and courts now face when attempting to redraw congressional dis-
trict lines, the Court should hold that creating a majority-minority
district to remedy a Section 2 violation is a compelling state inter-
est that is narrowly tailored.
Moreover, the Supreme Court should instruct the lower courts
to keep the analysis of compactness for Section 2 liability separate
from the equal protection analysis of the proposed remedy. With-
out these clarifications, legitimate vote dilution claims may be re-
jected unfairly, and congressional redistricting will remain akin to a
tightrope walk without a safety net.
district and develop a political profile, I would have been largely unknown to voters in
the new ... district, and unlikely to win election.").
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